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INSOLVENT DECEDENTS' ESTATES
Kurt H. Nadelmann*
HE problems of insolvent decedents' estates have created special
difficulties in all legal systems. Two unrelated fields of the law
are involved: decedents' estates and insolvency. Treatment of the topic
in works on one or the other field is often scanty and few studies exist
which deal exclusively with insolvent decedents' estates law. Research
in the conflicts problems of the field has led the writer to investigate the
differences in the treatment of insolvent decedents' estates in this country, other common law countries, and countries of the civil law. Results of this study are used to discuss problems of the domestic law on
insolvent decedents' estates against the background of developments
abroad.

T

I
In the administration of an insolvent estate of a deceased person
the assets are exhausted by the debts which the deceased has left. Nothing remains for distribution to legatees, devisees, and others entitled
thereto. Because all goes to the creditors, the problems involved are in
the main the same as in the case of a living debtor who becomes insolvent. Acknowledging this fact, most countries regulate the settlement
of insolvent decedents' estates by making their legislation on insolvent
estates, that is, their bankruptcy law, applicable to decedents' estates.
This has been done in civil law and common law countries as well.
While for solvent estates the methods employed for the liquidation of
the debts of a deceased person differ greatly under the common law
system and the systems primarily used on the civil law side,1 the same
is not true for insolvent decedents' estates.
Civil Law Countries
In the civil law countries, the bankruptcy law has long been made
applicable to estates of deceased persons. Where the bankruptcy law
covers only merchants a similar proceeding is generally available for
nonmerchants and this proceeding has been also extended to decedents'
estates.
* Chairman, Special Committee on ConHict of United States and Foreign Law of the
National Bankruptcy Conference; Formerly Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University
of Pennsylvania Law School. Dr. Nadelmann is now engaged in the preparation of a comparative study of the conHicts aspects of Bankruptcy Law.-Ed.
1 In most civil law countries, appointment of a personal representative for the liquidation of an estate is not necessary as a rule. See Rheinstein, "European Methods for the
Liquidation of the Debts of Deceased Persons," 20 IowA L. Ri;v. 431 (1935).
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The first modem codification of bankruptcy law, in the French
Code of Commerce of 1807,2 did not say whether a bankruptcy adjudication was possible after the death of a debtor. The courts were divided
on the issue, the prevailing view being that an adjudication could be
made if the debtor had "ceased payments" before his death. 3 Cessation
of payments was, and still is, the "act of bankruptcy" required for an adjudication under French law. 4 When the bankruptcy part of the Code
was revised in 1838, an express provision codified the majority view.
Under the provision, which has remained unchanged, bankruptcy may
be declared if the debtor had ceased payments at the time of his death
but the petition must be filed not later than one year after his decease. 5
For the "judicial liquidation," a second· type of bankruptcy proceeding,
the law of 1889 provides that it is available to the heirs in the case of
an insolvent estate provided the death took place within two weeks
after the cessation of payments. These two weeks· are the time limit
within which a debtor may take advantage of this-attenuated-bankruptcy proceeding. The heirs must file the petition within one month
following the death. 6
The French Code of Commerce has served as a model for legislation
in many countries in Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere. Thus the
commercial codes or bankruptcy statutes of, for example, the Netherlands,7 Belgium,8 Luxemburg,9 Portugal,1° Italy,1 1 Argentina,12 Uru2 The coutumes of Normandy, Brittany, and Lille had provided for a kind of bankruptcy administration of insolvent decedents' estates. GARRAUD, Dn LA Dncom::rrURE 64
(1880); 1 THALLER, Dns FArLLITEs EN DRorr COMPARE 194 (1887).
3 See 1 PERCERou, Dns FArLLITES ET BANQUERoUTEs, 2d ed., 287 (1935).
4 In most of the civil law countries, "cessation of payments" or "inability to pay,''
evidenced by cessation of payments, are the statutory requirements for a bankruptcy
adjudication. See FERNANDEZ, LA CESACION DE PAGOS EN EL DERECHO ARGENTINO y
UNIVERSAL (1939). The Italian bankruptcy law of 1942 requires existence of a "state
of insolvency,'' normally evidenced by stoppage of payments, and so does the Argentine
draft of 1950. The statutes of some civil law countries list "acts of bankruptcy" as
rebuttable presumptions of cessation of payments (inability to pay obligations which are
liquidated and due). See, e.g., the Mexican bankruptcy law of 1942. In at least one of
the common law countries, "ceases to meet liabilities generally as they become due" has
been made one of the statutory acts of bankruptcy: Canadian Bankruptcy Act of 1949,
§20(1)0). Cf. the South African Act No. 24 of 1936, §IO(b).
5 Code de Commerce art. 437 (2) (3) (1838), 21 CoMMERCIAL LAws OP THE WoRLD,
Am. ed., 132 (1911). GoIRAND, FRENCH COMMERCIAL LAw, 2d ed., 644 (1898); 7 LYoNCAEN ET RBNAULT, TRArTE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL, 5th ed., 90 (1934); 1 PERCERou, Dns
FArLLITES ET BANQUEROUTEs, 2d ed., 295 (1935).
6 Law of Judicial Liquidation of March 4, 1889, art. 1(2), 21 CoMMERCIAL LAws OP
THE WoRLD, Am. ed., 224 (1911). GoIRAND, FRENCH CoMMERCIAL LAw, 2d ed., 812
(1898).
7 Bankruptcy Law of Sept. 30, 1893, art. 198 to 202. MoLENGRAAPP, Dn PArLLISSEMENTSWET VERKLAARD, 3d ed., 610 (1936); 1 PoLAK, HANDBOEK vooR HET NEDERLANDSCHE HANDELS-EN FArLLISSEMENTSRECHT, 5th ed. 724 (1935); VoELLMER, DE PArLLISSBMENTSWET, 2d ed., 317 (1939).
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guay 13 Peru 14 Chile 15 Colombia 16 Venezuela 17 Haiti 18 Honduras 19
'
'
'
'
'
1
'
Mexico,20 and Egypt:2 1 provide, as does the French law, that a bankruptcy
adjudication is possible if a debtor had at his death ceased payments.
There is a difference in the time limits set forth for the filing of petitions. The period runs from three months after death, as in Venezuela,
to two years, as in Portugal and Mexico. Belgium, the Netherlands, Argentina, and Peru have a six months limitation and the other countries
have the one year period of the French Code. In a few countries, Honduras, for example, the period is counted not from the time of death
but from the date of the cessation of payments. .
The setting of a time limit has been criticized by some authors. It
has also been argued that the availability of the bankruptcy procedure
should not depend upon cessation of payments before death. The example cited is the insolvent debtor who omits to "cease payments"
before killing himself because of his financial difE.culties. 22 At least one
of the Latin American countries, Brazil, has given up the cessation of
payments requirement. 23 The time limitation is not found in the Span8

Code de Commerce art. 437(2), 442(3), 22 COMMERCIAL LAws OF

THB

WoRLD,

Am. ed., 105 (1911). 7 FREDERICQ, TRAITE DE DRoIT COMMERCIAL BELGE 75, 78 (1949).
Arrangements' Law of Aug. 10, 1946, art. 1(2). 8 id. 866.
9 Code de Commerce art. 437(3).
1 0 Codigo de Processo Civil art. 1137 (Decree 29.637 of May 28, 1939). BoRGES
P1RBS, PROCESSO CIVIL E COMMERCIAL (EXECUCOES, FALENCIAS E INSOLVENCIAS) 202
(1941).
11 Bankruptcy Act of March 16, 1942, art. 10, 11, [1942] Le Leggi 321; SA'ITA, IsnTUZION! DI Dmrrro FALLIMENTARB, 3d ed., 69, 72 (1948); DE SEMO, Dlm'ITo FALLIMEN·
TARB 76 (1948). Cf. 1 BoNELLI, DEL FALLIMENTO, 3d ed., 290 (1938).
12 Bankruptcy Law No. 11,719 of 1933, art. 4. 1 GARCIA MARTINEZ, EL CoNCORDATO
y LA QUIEBRA 121 (1940); I CASTILLO, LA QUIEBRA EN EL DERBCHO ARGENTlNO 70
(1940); Orione, ''Exposicion y Critica de la Ley de Quiebras," 1 QUIEBRAS 91 (1935); 5
RivARoLA, TRATADO DE DERBCHO CoMERCIAL ARGENTINO 34 (1940). Cf. PARRY, EL
CoNcunso CIVIL DE AcRBEDOREs, 3d ed., 107 (1944).
13 Codigo de Comercio art. 1573. SCARANO,• TRATADO TEoRico-PRAcnco DE LA
QumBRA 152 (1939).
14 Bankruptcy Law No. 7,566 of 1932, art. 10, 22. AncE MAs, QmEBRAS 28 (1938);
SANCHEZ PALACIOS, LEY PROCESAL DE QUIEBRAS 18 (1939).
15 Bankruptcy Law No. 1297 of 1931, art. 45. 1 DURAN BERNALES, ExPLICACIONES
y JURISPRUDENCIA DE LA LEY DE QUIEBRAS DE CHILE 216 (1935).
16 Bankruptcy Law No. 750 of 1940, art. 1. SPATH NERBL, LA QumBRA 83 (1940).
17 Codigo de Comercio art. 934 (1919).
18 Code de Commerce art. 477(2)(3) (1826), as amended by Decree Law of Dec. 22,
1944.
19 Codigo de Comercio art. 1063 (1940).
20 Bankruptcy Law of 1942, art. 3. RODRIGUEZ Y RODRIGUEZ, LEY DE QumBRAS Y
SUSPENSION DE PAGOS 14 (1943).
21 National Bankruptcy Law No. 56 of 1945, art. 209. 3 WAHL ET KAMEL A.
MALAcHE, TRAITE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL MIXTE ET NATIONAL 14, 29 (1946).
22 7 LYoN-CAEN ET RENAULT, TRAITE DB DROIT COMMERCIAL, 5th ed., 90 (1934).
23 Bankruptcy Law No. 7.661 of 1945, art. 3(1), 4(VIII), §2. 1 MmANDA VALVERDE,
CoMENTARios A Lm DB FALENCIAs 49, 64 (1948); 7 CARvALHo DB MENDONCA, TRATADO
DB DIREITo CoMERCIAL BRAsrtmno, 4th ed., 171, 172, n. 3 (1946).
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ish system. Under the Spanish law,24 found also in Cuba,25 both the
bankruptcy proceeding for merchants and the distribution proceeding
for nonmerchants may be used without limitation for the administration
of insolvent decedents' estates.
As for other systems, the law of Austria has provided, since the first
bankruptcy codes were passed late in the eighteenth century,26 that
insolvent decedents' estates shall be liquidated under the provisions of ·
the bankruptcy law. Both the present bankruptcy law and the arrangement law are available for decedents' estates.27 The provisions of the
Austrian law have been taken over by Yugoslavia28 and Czechoslovakia.29 The bankruptcy law of Hungary3° follows the Austrian law.
In Switzerland, the federal civil code prescribes31 that insolvent
decedents' estates shall be administered according to the provisions of
the federal bankruptcy law.32 In Sweden, the cr€:ditors may ask for a
bankruptcy adjudication and the administrator must file a bankruptcy
petition in the case of insolvency.33 Similar rules obtain in the other
Scandinavian countries.34
24 Code of Civil Procedure art. 1.053 (1880). 5 MAmrasA y NAVARRO, CoMBNTARios
A LA LEY DI! ENJUICIAMillNTO CIVIL, 6th ed., 24 (1946); 5 GAY DI! MoNTELLA, CoDIGO
DI! CoMBRCIO ESPANOL 145 (1936). .
2 5 Code of Civil Procedure art. 1.052 (1899). 4 AGUILAR ALMEIDA, LEY DE I!NJUICIAMII!NTO CIVIL 481 (1948); 2 CASASUS, LEY DI! ENJUICIAMIENTO CIVlI. 17 (1937).
2GGeneral Bankruptcy Law of 1781, art. 2; Courts Law for Western Galicia of 1796,
art. 79; Italian Courts Law of 1803, art. 74. HAIMBRL, VoRTRAEGI! UI!BER DEN CoNCtJRS
DER GLAI!UBIGER 19 (1840). Cf. 2 LEVY, CoMMI!RCIAL LAw 376, 377 (1852).
2 7Bankruptcy Law of 1914, art. 64, 69, 70, 100, 164; Arrangement Law of 1934, art.
1(3). 1 B.All.TscH AND PoLLAK, KoNKuns-, AusGLI!ICHS-, UND ANPECHTUNGSORDNUNG,
3d ed., 13 (1937), 2 id. 65.
28 Bankruptcy Law of 1929, art. 68, 69, 176; Arrangement Law of 1929, art. 1.
LACHNER, DAs NEUI! KoNKURS- UND AusGLI!ICHSRECHT JucosLAVIENS 31, 63, 69 (1930);
LEH, LA FAILLITE DANS LE DnoIT EunoPI!EN CONTINENTAL 62 (1932).
29 Bankruptcy Law of 1931, art. 1(3); Arrangement Law of 1931, art. I. Wmss,
CZECHOSLOVAXIscHE KoNKuns-, AusGLI!ICHs- UND ANPI!CHTUNGSORDNUNG 7 (1936).
SO Bankruptcy Law of 1881, art. 83, 117, 241, 28 CoMMI!RCIAL LAws OF THE WoRLD:
HUNG.All.Y, Am. ed., 146 (1911).
31 Civil Code, art. 597 (1907). ffi2 KoMMENTAR ZUM SCHWmZERISCHI!N Zivu.
GI!SETZBUCH, 2d Egger ed. by Escher, 92 (1943).
3 2 Law on Execution and Bankruptcy of 1889, art. 193. BLUMENSTEIN, HANDBUCH
DES SCHWEIZERISCHI!N 8CHULDBETREIBUNGSRECHTES 606 (1911); 1 CARL JAEGER, ScHULDBETREIBUNG UND KoNKURs 605 (1911); voN OVERBECK, SCHULDBETREIBUNG UND KoNxuns, 2d ed., 156 (1940).
33 Law on Administration of Estates of June 9, 1933, c. 2, §11(2); Bankruptcy Law
of May 13, 1921, §11(2); I BJoERLING, LAERoBox Crvn.RAETT, 12th ed., 323 (1950);
LAwsxx, KoNKuns-ocH AcxoRDsLAGARNA, 13th ed., 38 (1947); LIND, ScHWEDrsCHEs FAMILIEN-UND WRECHT 49, 134 in X ( 49) Dm ZIVILGESETZE DER GEGENW.All.T: DAS Zivu.
RECHT DER NORDISCHI!N LAENDER (1939).
34 See, for Denmark: DBUNTZER, DEN DANSKE SXIFTERET 667 (1885), MUNCH·
PETERSEN, SXIFTERETTEN 220 (1949); for Norway: HAGERUP, SXIFTE OG AnVEBBHANDLING, 3d ed.,' §21 (1924), id., KoNKuns oG AxxoRDFORHANDLING, 4th ed., 377 (1932).
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Of older German laws, the Bavarian Procedural Code of 175335
and the Prussian Procedural Code of 179336 had already provided that
the bankruptcy procedure shall be followed for insolvent decedents'
estates. The Prussian bankruptcy law of 18 55, modeled after the
French Code, did likewise.37 The first national legislation on bankruptcy in Germany, th~ Bankruptcy Act of 1877, was to the same effect
except that the "cessation of payment" requirement in the Prussian law
was not taken over. Instead, insolvency, in the sense of excess of debts
over the assets, was made the condition for bankruptcy adjudications
in the case of decedents' estates.38 The revision of the Act of 1877 in
1898 in connection with the enactment of the German Civil Code left
the system unchanged but new provisions were added39 to coordinate
it with the code's system of liquidation of debts of deceased persons
under which a bankruptcy petition is one of the means for the heirs to
' remove personal liability for the debts of the deceased. One of the new
provisions states that, also in the case of decedents' estates, the bankruptcy proceeding may terminate by way of a composition.40 The
benefits of the modem arrangements law have likewise been made
available to the heirs in the case of insolvency of the estate.41
The European example has been followed in the Far East. The
Chinese bankruptcy and arrangement law of 1935 provides that ''bankruptcy may ... be declared against the deceased's ... [estate] if it is
insufficient to pay the debts of the deceased...."42
British Commonwealth

In England, the administration of insolvent decedents' estates had
no connection with the bankruptcy legislation until 1873, the year of
the great reform of the courts system. The Supreme Court of Judicature Act of 1873 which remodeled the court system contained also a
35 Codex Juris Bavarici Judiciarii of 1753, c. 19, §4, c. 20, §3.
36 Allgemeine Gerichtsordnung of 1793, pt. I, tit. 50, §4; app. §§311, 312. Cf. 2
LEvx, CoMMBRCIAL LAw 291 (1852).
37Bankruptcy Code of May 8, 1855, art. 14, 114(2), 319, 342.
38 Bankruptcy Code of 1877, art. 202.
30Bankruptcy Code of 1898, art. 214 to 236, 24 COMMERCIAL LAws OP nm WoRLD,
Am. ed., 387 (1911). 2 ERNST JAEGER, KoMMENTAR ZUR KoNKURSORDNUNG, 6 and 7th
ed., 855 (1936); MENTZEL, KoMMENTAR ZUR KoNKURSORDNUNG, 5th ed., 663 (1937).
40 Under the Roman law compositions were allowed in the case of decedents estates.
WENGER, INSTITUTES oP nm Ro:r..lAN LAw oP CIVIL PaocEDURE, Fisk trans., 316 (1940);
Riesenfeld, "The Evolution of Modern Bankruptcy Law," 31 Mum. L. REv. 401 at 439
(1947).
41 Arrangement Law of Feb. 26, 1935, art. 113; Kame, VERGLEICHSORDNUNG 266
(1937).
42 Bankruptcy Law of 1935, art. 59 (Chang and Yung trans. 1936).
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few sections on law ref~rm. One of them dealt with the law applicable
to insolvent decedents' estates. It provided that in the administration
of the assets of any deceased whose estate may prove to be insufficient
for the payment in full of his debts, the same rules shall prevail as to
the respective rights of creditors and as to the debts and liabilities provable as may be in force under the law of bankruptcy, at the time the
Bankruptcy Act of 1869, with respect to the estates of persons adjudged
bankrupt.43 The Lord Chancellor, Lord Selborne, in introducing the
Bill, had said: "It is proposed that in the administration of insolvent
estates by the Court after the death of the debtor, substantially the rules
applicable to bankruptcy shall be adopted. There seems to be no good
reason why the estate of an insolvent debtor should 'be administered in
one way while he is living and in another way when he is dead."44
Scotland had preceded England with legislation in the :6.eld. The
Sequestration Act of 1839 had extended the process of sequestration in
bankruptcy' to deceased debtors, whether traders or not, 45 and this is
still the law in Scotland under the present bankruptcy legislation.46
The provision on insolvent decedents' estates in the Supreme Court
of Judicature Act of 1873 never took effect but was replaced by a similar provision in the Supreme Court of Judicature Act of 1875 which
declared the rules of the bankruptcy law applicable not only to insolvent decedents' estates, as in the Act of 1873, but also to the windingup of insolvent companies.47 This has remained the law both for companies48 and decedents' estates. For decedents' estates, the Administration of Estates Act of 1925 now provides that, when an estate is
insolvent, funeral, testamentary and admiriistrative expenses shall have
priority and that the same rules shall be observed regarding the rights
of creditors and priorities as in force under the Bankruptcy Act. 49
43 Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, §25(1), 36 & 37 Viet., c. 66. Cf. 55 L.T.
197 (Bill amendment), 372 (comment) (1873).
44 214 Hansard's Parl. Peb. 339 (3d ser. 1873), 54 L.T. 309 (1873). CHARLBY, JumCATURI! Acrrs, 3d ed., 278 (1877).
45 2 & 3 Viet., c. 41, §4 (1839). BURTON, LAW OF BANKRUPTCY IN SCOTLAND 277
(1845). Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act, 1856, §13(2). MtmDoCH, MANuAL OF BANKRUPT
LAW 11 (1856).
46 Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act, 1913, §11(2). 13 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THB LAws OF
ScoTLAND 357 (1932); GoUDY, LAw oF BANKRUPTCY IN ScoTLAND, 4th ed., 117 (1914).
47 Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1875, §10, 38 & 39 Viet., c. 77. GRIFFITH AND
LoVELAND, Tm! SUPREME CoURT oF JUDICATURE Acrrs, 2d ed., 34 (1877); l WILLIAMS,
LAw OF EXEcUToRs AND AD:MINISTRATORS, 11th ed., 770 (1921).
48 Companies Act, }948, §317. PALMER, COMPANY LAw, 19th ed., 396 (1949).
49 Administration of Estates Act, 1925, §34(1). 14 HALsBURy's LAws OF ENGLAND,
Hailsham ed., 461; I WI,LLIAMs, LAw OF EXECUTORS AND AD:MINisTRATORS, 12th ed.,
634 (193Q).
·
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A further development took place shortly after the 1873/75 reform.
When the bankruptcy law was revised under Joseph Chamberlain, a
new section was incorporated in the Bankruptcy Act of 1883 on "Administration in Bankruptcy of the Estate of a Person Dying Insolvent."00 Under the section, maintained in the current law, the Bankruptcy Act of 1914,51 any creditor whose claim would have been sufficient to support a bankruptcy petition against the debtor, had he been
alive, may obtain an "order for the administration of the estate according to the law of bankruptcy," unless the court is satisfied that there is
a reasonable probability that the estate will be sufficient for the payment
of the debts owing to the deceased. The personal representative is
served notice of the petition. He may also present such a petition himself. The law provides that, if proceedings have been commenced in
the chancery court for the administration of the estate, it is too late for
a petition to the bankruptcy court. The chancery court may, however,
in its discretion transfer the proceedings to the bankruptcy court when
satisfied that the estate is insufficient to pay its debts.
Under the section and the "rules of procedure" complementing it,
the proceeding before the bankruptcy court is, generally speaking, the
same as in a normal bankruptcy proceeding. Funeral and testamentary
expenses are given a first priority. Any surplus which may remain after
the payment of all debts, is turned over, in principle, to the personal
representative. The provisions of the Bankruptcy Act on proof of debts,
property available for payment of debts, effect of bankruptcy on antecedent and other transactions, realization of property and distribution
of property are declared applicable.
A controversy had developed soon after the passage of the Supreme
Court of Judicature Act as to whether the rules in the bankruptcy law
which, under the English terminology, "increase" the assets, namely,
the reputed ownership clause, the fraudulent preference clause, and
the sections which defeat certain settlements and executions, shall apply
to the administration of the assets of a deceased person. Sir George
Jessel, Master of the Rolls, ruled in the affirmative in a winding-up case
involving the identical question52 but the decision was overruled a few
50Bankruptcy Act, 1883, §125, 46 & 47 Viet., c. 52. WAcE ON BANKRUPTCY 329
(1904). Taken from the Scotch law: Memorandum, Board of Trade, in CHALMERS AND
HuGH, THE BANKRUPT Acrr 1883, pp. xii et seq. (1883).
Ill Bankruptcy Act, 1914, §130, 4 & 5 Geo. V, c. 59, Bankruptcy Rules 299 to 305.
2 HALSBURy's LAws oF ENGLAND, Hailsham ed., 131; WILLIAMS, LAw AND PRACTICE IN
BANKRUPTCY, 16th ed., 504 (1949); note, ''Deceaseds' Estates in Bankruptcy," 85 L.J.
(N.S.) 288, 305, 322, 341 (1938).
112 In re Printing and Numerical Registering Co., L.R. 8 Ch. D. 535 (1878).

1136

M1cmGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 49

years later,5 3 and it is well settled also for insolvent decedents' estates
that these rules of the bankruptcy law do not apply. This holds as well
for the section in the Administration of Estates Act as the section in the
Bankruptcy Act.54
Northern Ireland has followed the development in England. In
1929, a section was added to the Irish Bankruptcy Act similar to that in
the English Bankruptcy Act on the "Administration in Bankruptcy of
the Estate of a Person Dying Insolvent."55
The system of the English legislation has been incorporated, often
without any change, in many of the Bankruptcy Ordinances for British
Colonies or former Colonies. 56 The Indian Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act of 1909 may be cited as an example.57 The Palestine Bankruptcy Ordinance of 1936 is another but the text varies in some
respects. 58 One of the differences concerns the case where proceedings
for the administration of the estate had been commenced in another
than the bankruptcy court. If a petition is presented to the bankruptcy
court for the "administration in bankruptcy of the estate of the deceased
debtor according to the law of bankruptcy," it is then for the bankruptcy court, and not the other court, to decide whether the proceedings
shall be transferred to the bankruptcy court.
In South Africa, the Amsterdam Bankruptcy Ordinance of 1777
was long used as a model for the local bankruptcy ordinances. The Ordinance applied to living and deceased persons as well. 59 The present
53 In re Withernsea Brickworks, L.R. 16 Ch. D. 337 (C.A.) (1880). For incomplete
executions the bankruptcy rule was incorporated in the Companies Act, 1929, §268.
BuCKLEY ON nm COMPANIES Acrrs, 11th ed., 533 (1930). Section 325(l)(a) of the
Companies Act, 1948, now voids the benefits of incomplete executions and attachments
unless held otherwis~ by the court. 5 HALSBURYS LAws OF ENGLAND, 1949 ed., 778. Cf.
In re Suidair International Airways, Ltd., [1951] 1 Ch. 165, 66(2) T .L. Rep. 909 (1950)
(attachment by a domestic creditor made after winding-up order against the corporation in
South Africa upheld by court in ancillary winding-up).
54 Hasluck v. Clark, [1899] 1 Q.B. 699 (C.A.), following Re Gould, L.R. 19 Q.B.D.
92 (1887). Cf. Watkins v. Barnard, [1897] 2 Q.B. 521.
55Bankruptcy Amendment Act [Irish], 20 Geo. 5, c. 1, §21 (1929-1930) in 65 IR.
L.T., appendix, Publ. Gen. Stat., Northern Ireland 10, 16 (1931). Cf., for Eire, a proposed
amendment, 70 IR. L.T. 313 (1936).
56 References in: FEDERATION oF CHAMBERS oF COMMERCE oF nm BRITISH EMPIRE,
Bankruptcy Law in the British Empire (1932).
57 Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act, 1909, §108. MULLA, LAw OF lNsoLVENCY IN
BrunsH INDIA 511 (1930). Cf. GHOSH, THE PRoVINCIAL lNsoLVENCY Acrr, 11th ed., 187
(1940).
58 Bankruptcy Ordinance, No. 3 of 1936, §112, in 2 Palestine Ann. Laws 378 (Apelbom ed. 1944).
59 Ordinance of 1777, art. 4, HANDVESTEN, AMsTERDAM 102, 2d ser. Supp., Farret
ed. (1778). WESSELS, HrsTORY oF nm RoMAN-DUTCH LAw 667 (1908); VILLIERS, INSOLVENSIEREG 48 (1923). Cf. 1 BEAWES, LEX MERCATOruA, 6th ed. by Chitty, 753 (1813)
for earlier law.
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legislation of the Union of South Africa is the Administration of Estates Act of 1913. The act provides that the creditors may ask the court
for an adjudication of the estate as insolvent. 60 The effect of the adjudication is administration of the estate in bankruptcy. 61 In the absence of
a petition, the judicial administrator liquidates the estate under the
bankruptcy rules, unless a majority of the creditors asks for a surrender
of the estate to the bankruptcy court.
New Zealand has followed the development in the English law but
with some major differences. The Administration Act of 1908 has a
special part, "Administration by the Court," where rules for insolvent
estates are provided. 62 Creditors and administrator may ask for the liquidation of the estate under that part of the act. In such an administration
the rules of the Bankruptcy Act apply. Without the administrator's
consent a creditor petition is not possible before the expiration of two
months from the date of grant of probate or letters of administration unless the creditor proves that the deceased made some fraudulent preference or committed an act of bankruptcy within three months prior to
his decease. Transfers made or suffered by the deceased which would
have been void as against the trustee or the creditors, had the deceased
become bankrupt at the date of his death, are liable to be treated as void
or to be set aside by the trustee, as if the deceased had been alive.
In the Commonwealth of Australia where, under the Constitution,
the Commonwealth Parliament has power to legislate on ''bankruptcy
and insolvency,'' 63 the Commonwealth Bankruptcy Act 1924-1933 provides for the administration in bankruptcy of the estate of persons dying
insolvent. 64 Except for minor differences, the system is the same as that
in the English Bankruptcy Act. As in England, it is provided that a
petition may not be lodged if proceedings for the administration of the
state have been commenced in any court, but that such court may
transfer the proceedings to the bankruptcy court. The Federal Court
of Bankruptcy has held that the administration in bankruptcy of insol60 Administration of Estates Act No. 24 of 1913, §48(3). MEnnowrrz, AnMINisl'RATI0N 011 EsTAT.Bs 71, 153 (1949).
6 1 Insolvency Act No. 24 of 1936. MAits, LAW 011 INsoLVENCY IN SoUTH .APruCA,
4th ed., 27, 51 (1948).
62 Administration Act, 1908, No. 3, pt. IV, §§54 to 67. GARRow, LAw 011 WILLs
AND ADMINISTRATION, 2d ed., 590 (1949); SPRATT, LAw 011 BANXRUPTCY IN NBw ZEALAND 428 (1930).
63 Aust. Const., §51 (xvii).
64Bankruptcy Act 1924-1933, §§155, 156. LEWIS, AuSTRALIAN BANXRUPTCY LAw,
3d ed., 178 (1941); McDONALD, HENRY AND MEEK, Ausl'RALIAN BANKRUPTCY LAwPRACTICE, 2d ed., 480 (1940).
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vent estates of deceased debtors is not ultra vires the power conferred by
the Constitution on the Commonwealth Parliament. 65
In Canada, the Dominion bankruptcy legislation which in most respects follows the English bankruptcy law has no section corresponding
to that in the English Act on the "administration in bankruptcy of the
estate of a person dying insolvent." The Canadian statute has, on the
other hand, a statutory definition of the word "person," not found in
the English Act, which includes the heirs, executors, administrators, or
other legal representatives of a person. 66 On the basis of this definition,
it has been held by the courts in some provinces, Quebec67 and Saskatchewan, 68 for example, that a bankruptcy adjudication is possible
notwithstanding the death of the debtor. Courts in Nova Scotia have
taken the contrary view. 69 In Ontario, a decision of a Registrar (Referee) is for, 70 and one of a court is against admission.71 In British
Columbia the court of appeal was equally divided in a case which came
before it in 1934.72 An amendment to the Bankruptcy Act of 1919
passed in 1932 gave to funeral and testamentary expenses a first priority.73 The new Bankruptcy Act of December 1949, which has left
the definition of "person" unchanged, 74 now provides especially that a
bankruptcy petition may be £led against the estate of a deceased debtor75
and that the legal representatives of an insolvent deceased person may
start bankruptcy proceedings under the rules of the act. 7 6
United States

In the United States, the administration and liquidation of insolvent decedents' estates is not covered by national legislation. The vari65 Re Paravicini (deceased), 3 Aust. Bankruptcy Cases 15 (1930), 2 AuST. DIGEST
1825-1933, p. 931.
66 Bankruptcy Act of 1919, as amended, §2 (cc). DUNCAN AND Rmr.LEY, BANKRUP'l'CY
IN CANADA, 2d ed., 851 (1933); DB LA DURANTAYB, TRAITB DB LA FAILLITB 80 (1934).
67Jn re De Jos. Levesque, 13 Can. Bankr. Rep. 147, 70 Que. Super. Ct. 300 (1931);
In re Dame Joseph Levesque, 12 Can. Bankr. Rep. 290, 69 Que. Super. Ct. 148 (1931).
68 In re Rombough Estate, 15 Can. Bankr. Rep. 124, [1933] 3 W.W. Rep. 396 (Sask.
K.B. 1933).
69 In re Cavicchi, 16 Can., Bankr. Rep. 272 (1935), 8 M.P.R. 386, [1935] 2 D.L.R.
64, reversing 16 Can. Bankr. Rep. 36, [1935] 1 D.L.R. 154 (N.S.C.A.).
70 In re Millar, 5 Can. Bankr. Rep. 732, 28 Ont. W. Notes 235 (1925).
71 In re Gardner, 7 Can. Bankr. Rep. 513, 30 Ont. W. Notes 97 (1926).
72Yorkshire Ins. Co. v. Bank of Toronto, 15 Can. Bankr. Rep. 282 (1933), [1934] 1
W.W. Rep. 416, 48 Br. Col. L. Rep. 1, [1934] 2 D.L.R. 65.
73 Section 125 B, added by 22 Geo. 5, c. 39, §42 (1932).
74 Bankruptcy Act 1949, 13 Geo. 6, c. 7, §2(m); cf. §95(I)(a).
75 Section 22 of the Act. BRADFORD AND GREEN.BERG, CANADIAN BANKRUP'l'CY Ac:r,
3d ed., 86 (1951).
.
76 Section 26(1). BRADFORD AND GREEN.BERG, CANADIAN BANKRUP'l'CY Ac:r, 3d ed.,
91 (1951).
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ous national bankruptcy acts have dealt with the situation arising from
the death of the debtor during the bankruptcy proceeding but not before it. The Act of 1800, in force until 1803, provided that the proceeding should continue if the bankrupt died "after any commission of
bankruptcy sued forth." 77 The Act 'of 1841, repealed in 1843, allowed
the suit to abate on the death of the bankrupt.7 8 The Act of 1867, repealed in 1878, permitted an abatement without requiring it.7° The
present bankruptcy statute, the Act of 1898, provides that the death of
a bankrupt "shall not abate the proceedings, but [that] the same shall
be conducted and concluded in the same manner, so far as possible, as
though he had not died."80 This is how far the national legislation has
gone for bankruptcy, but there is more to be said about the national
legislation.
When by Act of March 3, 1933, section 74 on "Compositions and
Extensions" and section 75 on "Agricultural Compositions and Extensions" were added to the National Bankruptcy Act, the amendment provided that, for the purposes of these two sections, the term "farmer"
shall include the personal representative of a deceased farmer. 81 An
amendment to section 74, the general "Compositions and Extensions"
section, passed in 1934, made this extension a general one in providing
that section 74 "shall include the personal representative of a deceased
individual for the purpose of effecting settlement or composition with
the creditors of the estate: Provided, however, That such personal representative shall first obtain the consent and authority of the court which
has assumed jurisdiction of said estate, to invoke the relief provided by
said Act of March 3, 1933."82 The amending act did not add a similar
77 U.S. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, §45, 2 Stat. L. 33; Caines, Lex Mercatoria Americana
479 (1802).
78 U.S. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, 5 Stat. L. 440: No provision made for continuation.
79 U.S. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, §12, 14 Stat. L. 522. BuMP, PRACTICE IN BANKRUPTCY, 10th ed., 662 (1877); JAMEs, THE BANKRUPT LAw OF THE UNITED STATES 30
(1867).
80 U.S. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended, §8, 52 Stat. L. 848 (1938), 11 U.S.C.
§26 (1946). 1 CoLLmR, BANKRUPTCY, 14th ed., §§4.07, 8.02 (1940 and 1950 Supp.); 1
REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY, 5th ed., §§75, 107 (1950).
The same is said in this provision for insanity. Insanity will not be discussed in this
paper. For the English law in this regard, see WILLIAMS, LAW AND PRACTICE IN BANKRUPTCY, 16th ed., 42 (1949).
81 Act of March 3, 1933, §75(r), 47 Stat. L. 1470 at 1473: "For the purpose of this
section and section 74, the term 'farmer' means any individual who is personally bona :fide
engaged primarily in farming operations . . . and includes the personal representative of a
deceased farmer; and a farmer shall be deemed a resident of any county in which such
farming operations occur." GILBERT's CoLtmR ON BANKRUPTCY, 3d ed., 1334, 1342
(1934): "It is an entirely new feature in bankruptcy practice to extend the benefits to the
personal representative of a deceased debtor."
82 Act of June 7, 1934, §2, 48 Stat. L. 911 at 922, amending §74(e) of the Act of
1898, as amended. G1LllERTS COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 4th ed., 1323, 1338 (1937).
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leave-requiring proviso to section 75, the section on "Agricultural Compositions and Extensions," nor was such a requirement added when
the definition of "farmer" was rewritten in 1935.83 The Supreme Court
of the United States held, however, in Harris v. Zion's Savings Bank
& Trust Co. 84 that the same intent ·of Congress as expressed for section
74 should be implied as to section 75.
Section 74, under which, it may be added, an order of liquidation
or adjudication in bankruptcy could be made in the case of failure of
the composition proceeding,85 disappeared with the revision of the
Bankruptcy Act in 1938. The new "Arrangements" chapter which replaced the compositions sections 74 and 12, does not provide that the
personal representative of a deceased debtor may avail himself of the
arrangement proceeding. Section 75 on "Agricultural Compositions
and Extensions," on the other hand, has remained in force. 86 Relief
under it may still be obtained by the personal representative of a deceased farmer, with the qualification resulting from the Harris case that
leave must be obtained by the personal representative from the court
with jurisdiction for the estate. This is therefore a situation, and the
only situation, where national legislation is presently available for the
settlement, in one way at least, of the insolvent estate of a deceased
person.
In the United States it is state law which governs the field of insolvent decedents' estates. 87 The passing of national legislation on bankruptcy has had an effect on the state law, however. Because bankruptcy has been covered by the national legislation, state law did not
develop any further in the field. The few situations to which the
national legislation is not made applicable were not important enough
83 Act of May 15, 1935, §3, 49 Stat. L. 246, 11 U.S.C. §203(r): ''For pUipOSes of
this section, section 4(b), and section 74, the term 'farmer' includes not only an individual
who is primarily bona fide personally engaged in producing products of the soil, but also
any individual who is primarily bona fide personally engaged in dairy farming, the production of poultry or livestock, or the production of poultry products or livestock products in
their unmanufactured state, or the principal part of whose income is derived from any one
or more of the foregoing operations, and includes the personal representatives of a deceased
farmer; and a farmer shall be deemed a resident of any county in which such operations
occur." GILBERTS CoLLIBR ON BANKRUPTCY, 4th ed., 1362, 1375 (1937). The reference
to section 74, repealed by the Chandler Act in 1938, has been dropped by Act of March 4,
1940, 54 Stat. L. 40.
84 317 U.S. 447, 63 S.Ct. 354 (1942), noted 43 CoL. L. RBv. 516 (1943). Opinion
by Justice Roberts, dissenting opinion by Justice Douglas in which Justices Black and
Murphy joined.
85 Act of March 3, 1933, §74(1), 47 Stat. L. 1467.
86 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended, §75(r), 54 Stat. L. 40 (1940), 11 U.S.C.
(1946) §203. 5 CoLLIBR, BANKRUPTCY, 14th ed., §75.13 (1943 and 1950 Supp.); 10
REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY §4016 (1947).
87V\lhite v. Cormier, 311 Mass. 537 at 540, 42 N.E. (2d) 256 (1942).
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to warrant continued action on the part of the state legislatures. As a
result, state insolvency legislation is antiquated and not of the quality
of the present-day national bankruptcy law. Had there been no national legislation and had the states continued to legislate on insolvency, the
legislation might well have been extended to decedents' estates as has
happened elsewhere.
A presentation of the law on insolvent decedents' estates in the fortyeight states, the District of Columbia, and the Territories would be a
considerable undertaking. Woerner's summary account in his American Law of Administration88 will be relied upon for the purposes of this
discussion. Though no new edition of the work has appeared since
1923, the account given of the insolvent estates' law is, on the whole,
still accurate. The recent revisions of the law of administration in
many states did not affect, in general, the law for insolvent estates.
As outlined by Woerner, a few states prescribe a procedure for
the administration of insolvent estates different from that applicable to
ordinary cases. This special procedure varies from state to state89 but,
broadly speaking, it is insolvency legislation adapted to the case of the
estate of a deceased person. Insolvency legislation in force when these
statutes were passed apparently furnished the pattern for the procedure. 90
Woerner saw no need for a separate procedure. He wrote in 1889,
at a time when no national bankruptcy law was in force, and this was
carried over in the later editions: "The functions of the executor or
administrator seem to be fully adequate in either case, since they possess
all the powers of assignees, or receivers of insolvent debtors; and the
powers of Probate courts are peculiarly adapted to secure the rights of
creditors with full protection to executors and administrators." 91 It is
difficult to agree with this.view on principle even if the status of presentday bankruptcy law is not considered. The law of administration of
estates has evolved for the purposes of estates where the assets are not
absorbed by the debts and something goes to the beneficiaries. Insolvent
88 2 WoERNER, THE AMERICAN I.Aw OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., c. 44, beginning
at 1337 (1923).
89 Id. at 1339.
90 Yet in Massachusetts the legislation for the distribution of insolvent decedents' estates
[Mass. Laws 1784, c. 2, II Mass. Rev. Stat. 438 (1836)] has influenced the insolvency
legislation respecting living debtors (Mass. Laws 1838, c. 163) which, in turn, has had its
effects on the national bankruptcy legislation. WARREN, BANKROPTCY IN UNITED STATES
HxsTORY 70 (1935); Commissioners' Report of May 31, 1831 in Can.mt, INsotVENT
l.Aws OF MAssAcmrsETTs, 2d ed., 153, 155, 160 (1853); Cushing, "Insolvent Law of
Massachusetts,'' 19 AMER. JtIRisT & I.Aw MAc. 302 (1838).
912 WOERNER, THE AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION 852 (1889); 2 id. 1338
(3d ed. 1923).
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estates law has had its own evolution which has resulted in a highly
developed technique to deal with the problems typical for insolvent
estates. In insolvency proceedings, choice of the trustee by the creditors
is an important factor. The executor designated by the debtor or the
dose relative of the debtor appointed as administrator is certainly not
as logical a choice for liquidating an insolvent estate. The point could
be carried further by discussing other important features of insolvency
prQCedure and by considering the status of immovable property in estates' law. The same procedure is not likely to be adequate for two
different situations. Each situation asks for a proceeding adapted to its
special needs.
Whatever the answer to the question of a distinct procedure, does
the law in the states provide all the powers necessary to secure the
rights of the creditors if the present-day bankruptcy law is taken as a
test? To start with fraudulent conveyances, executors and administrators hold in many states the powers needed but they do not have them
everywhere.92 The drafters of the Model Probate Code published in
1946 have found it advisable to include a special provision to that
effect93 because of existing uncertainty and consequent litigation. 04
As for preferences, the late Professor Glenn wrote in 1940 in his
work, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences: "A serious defect in
our system, so far as preferences are concerned, appears with the estate
of decedents." 95 Hardly anywhere does state law provide that preferences may be set aside in the case of decedents' estates. In Massachusetts, a law was passed in 1922° 6 which embodied in the law on insolvent decedents' estates contents of the section on preferences in the
National Bankruptcy Act. 97 Massachusetts has not incorporated the
contents of present section 67(a) of the Bankruptcy Act9 8 under which
9 21

GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES, rev. ed., 214 (1940).
Section 125 of the Model Probate Code, contained in BASYE AND SIMES, PROBLEMS
IN PROBATE LAW 134 (1946).
94 Model Probate Code §125, Comment.
95 2 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CoNVEYANCEs AND PREFERENCES, rev. ed., 675 (1940).
96Act of 1922, c. 175, §2, 6 Mass. Ann. Laws, c. 198, "Insolvent Estates of Deceased
Persons," §§IDA to I0C (1933). The four months period counts back from the date of
the decease of the debtor instead of the filing of the bankruptcy petition as under the National Bankruptcy Act. See NEWHALL, SEITLEMENT oF EsTATEs OF DECEASED PERSONS
rn MASSACHUSETTS, 3d ed., 408 (1937).
97 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended, §60(a), 32 Stat. L. 799 (1903), §60(b), 36
Stat. L. 842 (1910) (preference within four months voidable if person benefited thereby
had reasonable cause to believe that the enforcement of judgment or transfer would effect a
preference). 2 CoLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, 13th ed., 1239 (1923).
98 52 Stat. L. 875 (1938), 11 u.s.c. (1946) §107. 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, 14th
ed., §67.07 (1942). Cf. Mussman and Riesenfeld, "Garnishment and Bankruptcy," 27
MrnN. L. REv. 1, 56 (1942).
93
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liens obtained by attachment, judgment, levy, or other legal or equitable process within four months before the £.ling of a petition in bankruptcy are deemed null and void if at the time when the lien was obtained the debtor was insolvent, irrespective of whether the lienholder
had cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent. 99 The example set
by Massachusetts in 1922 does not seem to have been followed elsewhere. If the national legislation is taken as an expression of what is
now held proper legislation on insolvent estates,100 Glenn's statement
certainly cannot be contradicted.
Priorities of debts is another subject where state law has not always
followed general developments. In some states, certain priorities at
common law, like the priority of judgment debts and the one for debts
by specialty, are still applicable to the liquidation of insolvent decedents'
estates. A statute of Georgia recognizes the priority in favor of debts
by specialty.101 Quite a number of states have kept judgments as a class
entitled to priority.102 The priority for judgments is found also in the
District of Columbia.103 Bankruptcy legislation has never granted priority to these debts.104
The Model Probate Code has not carried over the priority at common law for judgments and debts by specialty; nor is the priority of
debts due and payable over debts not due recognized. Under the code,
section 142, the order of payment in the case of insufficient assets to
pay all claims and allowances in full is105 (I) costs and expenses of
administration, (2) reasonable funeral expenses, (3) allowance made
to the surviving spouse and children of the decedent, ( 4) all debts and
taxes having preference under the laws of the United States, (5) reasonable and necessary medical expenses of the last illness of the dece99 Attachments are dissolved by appointment of a receiver within four months after
attachment. 7 Mass. Ann. Laws, c. 223, §130 (1933), Second Nat. Bank of Pittsburgh v.
J. C. Lappe Tanning Co., 198 Mass. 159, 84 N.E. 301 (1908). They are also dissolved
by death of the debtor. Mass. Ann. Laws, c. 223, §116 (1933). Cf. note, 21 A.L.R. 272,
287 (1922). This dissolution was originally limited to the case of insolvency of the estate.
Mass. Laws 1783, c. 59, §2.
100 The four months rule against attachments is also in the Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act, §9, [9 U.L.A. 417, 423 (1942)].
101 Ga. Code Ann. §113-1508 (1933).
102 2 WoERNER, THE AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., 1208 (1923).
10a D.C. Code §18-520 (1940).
104 U.S. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, §31, 2 Stat. L. 19 [taken from 21 Jae. 1, c. 19, §9
(1623)]. In the Act of 1898 the reference, for priorities, to state law has been removed,
except for landlords, by the Chandler Act (1938). U.S. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as
amended, §64, 52 Stat. L. 874, 11 U.S.C. (1946) §104. 3 CoLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, 14th
ed., §64.01 (1941).
105Model Probate Code §142, in BASYE AND S1MEs, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAw 148
(1946).
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dent, including compensation of persons attending him, (6) all debts
and taxes having preference under the laws of the state, (7) all other
claims allowed. The principle of pro rata payment is stated in a provision to the effect that no preference shall be given in the payment of
any claim over any other claim of the same class. The code does not
provide for the voidance of preferences. The procedure for solvent and.
insolvent estates is fundamentally the same. The primary concern of
the drafters of the code was, it would seem, a model procedure for solvent estates.106
A detailed comparison of the laws on insolvent decedents' estates
in the states and of these laws with the national bankruptcy law should
yield valuable information on e$cacy, duration, costs, and other elements of importance to judge the merits of the respective procedures.
Such information would provide an incentive to improve the status of
the law wherever necessary. A Model Code for Insolvent Decedents'
Estates could be drafted on the basis of the study.

II
The frequency of conflicts of jurisdictions and of laws under a federal system where the jurisdiction over insolvent decedents' estates
is in the hands of the states makes a discussion of the conflicts problems advisable in any consideration of the American law on insolvent
decedents' estates. The discussion will be limited here to some questions
which arise in connection with proof of claims. References to foreign
conflicts rules are included for the purposes of comparison.
In connection with conflicts on the international level, a word may
be said about consular treaties with provisions on decedents' estates.
Some of these treaties not only permit consuls to intervene in local proceedings involving the estate of a deceased national but allow them to
take direct charge of the personal property of the deceased. When the
local assets are insufficient to pay all debts, such treaties p;ovide especially that the creditors may request the local authorities to open bankruptcy proceedings and this terminates the consul's powers.107
106 Model Probate Code §148, "Payment of Claims,'' provides:· ''If it appears at any
time that the estate is or may be insolvent, that there are insufficient funds at hand, or that
there is other good and sufficient cause, the personal representative may report that fact to
the court and apply for any order that he deems necessary in connection therewith." That
is how far the Code goes in this respect.
107 Cf. Research in International Law, "The Legal Position and Functions of Consuls,''
26 AM.. J. lNr. L. Supp. 272 (1932). Convention on Succession between Spain and Greece
of March 6, 1919, Art. 10, 3 LEAGUE OF NATIONS TRI!ATY SI!RII!S 82. Other treaties of
Spain: 2 Gor.nsCHMIDT, SxsTI!MA Y FILosoFIA DI!L llillilCHO lNrI!RNACIONAL PRIVADO
472 (1949); 9 MARTINI!z Ar.canILLA, D1cc10NA1Uo DI! LA ADMINISTRACION EsPANOLA,
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Civil Law Countries

In the civil. law countries, where the bankruptcy law has long been
applied to insolvent decedents' estates, conflicts problems for insolvent
decedents' estates are not treated separately from problems arising in
bankruptcy. Whether assets of the insolvent estate are administered
abroad in bankruptcy or under estates' law will make no difference from
the conflicts viewpoint. Problems resulting from the insolvency will be
treated as bankruptcy problems.
The bankruptcy treaties now in force between many civil law countries108 which provide for the administration of the whole estate at one
place apply automatically to insolvent decedents' estates because of the
extension of the bankruptcy law to estates of deceased persons.109
Separate treatment of debts of deceased persons is found only in the
system of the Montevideo Treaties on Private International Law which
also follow a different policy for bankruptcy. Several bankruptcy administrations are allowed and priority rights are given to creditors with
claims payable in the country where the separate administration takes
place.110 The Treaty on International Civil Law, the one dealing with
decedents' estates,111 prescribes that the law of the location of the assets,
movable or immovable, shall apply to questions of succession. It also
provides that debts payable in one of the contracting states shall have
priority in regard to property located in that state at the time of the
death of the debtor. If that property is insufficient to pay such debts,
the creditors shall recover the balance proportionally from the assets
left in other places, and when the debts are payable at a place where no
assets are left, the creditors shall demand payment proportionally from
the assets left in other places, subject to the priority right of the creditors with debts payable at such places.11 2
5th ed., 839, 870, 892, 805 (1894). Treaties of France: Jordan, "Consul," in 5 REPERTOIRE DB Dnorr lNrBRNATIONAL 98 (de Lapradelle et Niboyet eds. 1929). Convention
on Decedents' Estates between Germany and Austria of Feb. 5, 1927, §21, [1927] 2
Reicbsgesetzblatt 505.

10s Cf. Nadelmann, "Bankruptcy Treaties," 93 Umv. PA. L. REv. 58 (1944), IO
REVISTA DB LA EsctmLA NACIONAL DE JURisPRUDBNCIA, No. 37, 105 (Mexico 1948).
109 The reservation in the Scandinavian Bankruptcy Convention of Nov. 7, 1933, Art.
11, 6 HUDSON, lNrBRNATIONAL LEGISLATION 496 (1937), has been removed by the
Scandinavian Decedents' Estates Convention of Nov. 19, 1934, §24, 6 id. at 947, MONCHPETBRSEN, SKIFTBRETTBN, 3d ed., 310, 328 (1949).
110 Cf. Nadelmann, "Bankruptcy Treaties," 93 Umv PA. L. REv. 58 at 70 (1944);
id., ''EI Profesor Melli y el Regimen de la Quiebra en el Congreso Sud-Americano de
Montevideo," 12 BoLBTIN DB LA FAcULTADDBDERllCHOYCIBNCIAS SoCIALBs DE CoRDOBA
83, 85 (Argentina 1948).
111 Montevideo Treaty of 1889 on International Civil Law, tit. 12. English text in
2 lNrBRNATIONAL AMERICAN CoNFBRllNCB 891 (1890).
112 Sections 46 to 48.
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The drafter of this unique system for the payment of debts owed
by one and the same person thought that, in adopting the principle of
"territoriality" for questions of succession, one had to make "territorial"
also the liquidation of debts. Wrote he: "What the territorial interests
ask for is that the claims located in one state shall affect with priority
the assets located in that territory because the holders of these claims
must have taken into account the assets and debts which the deceased
had in the state. . . ."113 He also emphasized that the same priority
system was prescribed for bankruptcy by the commercial codes of
Uruguay-his country-and Argentina.
It may be recalled that, under the la.w of Argentina, Uruguay, and a
number of other Latin American countries, the local creditors are paid
with priority in the case of concurrent bankruptcies up to the full
amount of their claims.114 The priority system has been under attack
for a long time. 115 Should it be abandoned for bankruptcy, its disappearance from the field of decedents' estates may also be expected.116
The breaking up, for the payment of claims, of an insolvent estate
according to the location of its assets with priority rights assigned to
"local" claims is a feature in Latin American law which does not have
its source in European law. In European law, the general principle has
long been the admission without differentiation of all claims in the
administration of an insolvent estate, regardless of whether another
administration takes place abroad. 117 Payments received by a creditor
out of assets abroad are taken into account in the domestic distributions
for equalization purposes. This is the prevailing rule, expressed in a
statutory provision in the Netherlands118 and established by court decisions in France,119 Italy,1 20 and Switzerland.121
11s GoNZALo RAM.nraz, PnoYEcro DE Comoo DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO
CoMENTARIO 180 (1888) (our trans.).
114 Nadelman, "Concunent Bankruptcies and Creditor Equality in the Americas,'' 96
Umv. PA. L. REv. 171 at 178 (1947), 22 REFEREES' J. 51 (1948), 25 .Amro-ARio DI
Drnrrro CoMPARATO 105 (Italy 1950).
115 See, notably, Resolution of the Sixth Conference of the Inter-American Bar Association in Nadelmann, "Creditor Equality in Inter-State Bankruptcies," 98 Umv. PA. L. REv.
41 (1949), 55 REvxsTA JURIDICA .ARGENTINA LA LEY 1037 (1949), 2 BoLETIN DEL
lNs'.ITrtITo DB DBRECHo CoMPARADo DB Mmaco, No. 6, 250 (1949).
116 The system was kept unchanged though in the revised Montevideo Treaty' of 1940
on International Civil Law, 8 HunsoN, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 514 (1949). Peru,
one of the signatories of the treaty of 1889, signed the new treaty with reservations. See
BusTAMANTB r RxvEno, EL TRATADO DB DEREcHo CIVIL INTERNACIONAL DE 1940, p. 134
(1942). For criticism from Brazil, see Espinola, "0 Tratado de Montevideu de 1940 e o
parecer do professor Haroldo Valadao,'' 58 DIREITO 7 (Brazil 1949).
117 Cf. Nadelmann, "Legal Treatment of Foreign and Domestic Creditors," 11 LAw
& CoNTEM. PROB. 696 (1946).
11s Bankruptcy Law of Sept. 30, 1893, art. 203, [1893] Staatsblad No. 140.
119 E.g., Appeal Paris, July 22, 1929, Banque Russo-Asiatique, 56 JoURNAL DU DRorr
INTERNATIONAL 1116 (France 1929), 25 REVUE DB DROIT INTERNATIONAL PmvE 119
Y
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England
In England, because of the separate treatment, only recently
abandoned, of insolvent decedents' estates and insolvent estates of living persons, there have been conB.icts decisions for each field. Decisions
for bankruptcy are more numerous than for insolvent decedents' estates.
The authors on conB.ict of laws still deal with the subjects separately.
Re Kloebe,1 22 a decedents' estates case, is the leading case for the
principle of equal admission of foreign and qomestic creditors in the
administration of an insolvent estate which has assets also abroad. Re
Kloebe was begun shortly before the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act
of 1883 with its new decedents' estates section and decided shortly
afterwards. The principle of Re Kloebe has been followed by the courts
in Ontario and other common law jurisdictions of the British Commonwealth.123
For bankruptcy, it was well established long before Re Kloebe that
a creditor who has received payments outside England and wants to
participate in the distributions in the English bankruptcy proceeding
must wait until the other creditors have received as much as he obtained
abroad.124 This rule implies the right of all creditors to prove in the
proceeding.
The principle of equalization when payments were received abroad,
called in England the hodge podge rule, has been derived from the
equity principle that "he who asks for equity must do equity."125 Its
application in the English courts goes back to at least 1762 as is now
known from the opinion of Lord Mansfield in Rickards 11. Hudson126
which has been recently uncovered.121 In Rickards 11. Hudson, an ap(France 1930). BATIFFOL, TRAlT.E ELBMENTAIRE DB DnoIT OOERNATIONAL Pl!IVll 800
(1949); 6 NmoYET, TRAlT.E DB DnoIT OOERNATIONAL PllIVll FRANCAIS 161 (1949).
120 E.g., Appeal Milan, March 23, 1923, Irving National Bank v. Dilsizian Freres, 21
fuvJ:STA DBL Drnrrro CoMMBRCIALB, Part II, 400 (Italy 1923), 65 MoNITORB Dm
TnmUNALI 868 (Italy 1924). SA'ITA, IsTITUTI DI DIRI'ITO FALLIMENTARB 51, n. 41 (1943).
121 Fed. Trib., May 19, 1904, In re Bartschi, 30 Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen
Bundesgerichtes I. 438. Cf. Appeal Bale, July 5, 1883, In re Scholer & Martin, ill (N.F.)
Zeitscrift fi.ir Schweizerisches Recht 135 (1884).
122L.R. 28 Ch. D. 175 (1884). DICEY, CoNFLICT oF LAws, 6th ed., 8ll (1949);
CHBsHIRB, PRIVATE OOERNATIONAL I.Aw, 3d ed., 671 (1947); SCHMITrHoFF, ENGLISH
CoNFLICT oF LAws, 2d ed., 224 (1948); BBNTWICH, THE I.Aw OF DoMICILB IN ITS RELATION TO SuccBSSION 79 (1911).
123 Milne v. Moore, 24 Ont. R. 456 (1894); Re Scatcherd, 15 Ont. W. Notes 222
(1918). 2 JOHNSON, CoNFLICT OF LAws 527 (1934).
124 Leading case: Banco de Portugal v. Waddell, 5 App. Cas. 161 (1880).
125 Lord Eldon in Selkrig v. Davies and Salt, 2 Dow 230, 249, 3 Eng. Rep. 848
(H.L. 1814).
126 Cited in Hunter v. Potts, 4 T.R. 182, 100 Eng. Rep. 962 (1791).
127 SMITH, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS 490
(1950).
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peal to the Privy Council from Virginia, the validity of an attachment
in Virginia made after bankruptcy adjudication of the debtor in Eng-_
land was the issue. Lord Mansfield is reported to have said:
". . . in case of effects being abroad, if before they are got in
by the assignees, a creditor residing there gets the start either by
attaching the effects or by some other method allowed by the law
of the country, that can't be helped; but such creditor would not
be permitted to receive anything further here until the other creditors had received as much as such creditor had done out of the
foreign effects .... And this, he said he had known done."128
Rickards v. Hudson and Cleeve v. Miller, a similar case decided in
1764, of which we now have the opinion,129 show that the later American decisions were in line with precedent in upholding as they did
attachments made after a bankruptcy decision abroad.130 It is not likely
that Solomons v. Ross,1 31 decided in 1766, was meant to contradict the
two Privy Council decisions. In that case, reported in different ways,1 32
an Amsterdam trustee in bankruptcy was allowed to obtain assets
against which foreign attachment proceedings had been begun.
It is not clear to what extent English courts will follow the principle,
expressed in the Restatement of the American law of conflict of laws,
that in the payment of creditors of an insolvent estate the court in each
state will, as far as possible, secure pro rata payment of all claims.133 In
In re Lorillard,1 34 a chancery case decided in 1922, the deceased who
had his domicil in New York and whose beneficiaries were in England,
left creditors and assets in New York and in England. The estate was
insolvent as a whole. A judgment claim for a substantial amount was
good in New York but barred in England by the statute of limitations.
The English assets more than covered the local debts which were paid.
The New York administrator asked for the surplus to pay the debts allowed in New York. The English court directed the surplus to be
handed over to the beneficiaries and not to the New York administrator
12s Id. at 491, n. 99.
129 Id. at 492.
.
130 STORY, CoMMENTARIEs ON THE CoNFLICT oF LAws, 8th ed., 572 (1883). Equality may be preserved by way of local bankruptcy proceedings. Cf. Nadelmann, "The National Bankruptcy Act and the Conflict of Laws," 59 HARv. L. REv. 1025 at 1035 (1946).
1311 H. Bl. 131 n., 126 Eng. Rep. 79 n. (1764).
132 Wallis-Lyne, Ir. Ch. 59 n. Nadelmann, "Solomons v. Ross and International
Bankruptcy Law," 9 Mod. L. Rev. 154 (1946).
133 CONFLICT OF LAws RESTATEMENT §501 (1934). The principle was not in the
fust draft; see Goodrich, ''Yielding Place to New: Rest Versus Motion in the Conflict of
Laws," 50 CoL. L. REv. 881 at 884 (1950).
134 [1922] 2 Ch. 638, 92 L.J. Ch. 148, 154 L.T. 390, 13 Br. R.C. 560; GRAVESON,
CAsBs ON CoNFLICT oF LAws 457 (1949).
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on behalf of the creditors. The court of appeal confirmed, holding that
it was a matter of discretion whether to remit the surplus to the New
York administrator and that there would be no justification for interfering with the discretion as exercised. .
The late A. Berriedale Keith, editor of the fourth and fifth editions
of Dicey, discussed the decision critically in an elaborate note in the
Appendix.135 This note was not included in the recently published
sixth edition, nor is any reference found therein to Professor Keith's
views136 or the criticisms expressed in this country1 37 and elsewhere.138
The decision seems to call for comment if only because of the reasoning
given by the court of appeal in support of the decision. It has been
held in England as well as here that it is a matter of discretion whether
to turn over local assets to a foreign administrator or to proceed locally
with the distribution of the assets under the applicable law.139 But does
a court remain within the realm of "discretion" when the decision affects
the result as in the instant case? The real issue was recognition or nonrecognition of the estate as a whole for the payment of debts. Only
"comity" may ask for the treatment of a decedent's estate as a "unitary
matter."140 Has it not been the practice of the courts to justify nonexercise of comity? The OJ?inion in In re Lorillard leaves basic questions unanswered and it remains to be seen whether the courts will
adopt the same policy in a similar case involving the estate of a living
debtor adjudged bankrupt abroad.141
135 DxcBY, CoNFLICT OP LAws, Appendix, Note 27, "Principal and Ancillary Administrations," 936 ( 4th ed. 1927), 984 (5th ed. 1932).
136 Id. The case is discussed at 811 (6th ed. 1949).
137 3 BBALB, CoNFLICT OP LAws §523.1 (called an abuse of discretion); Note, 36
HARv. L. RBv. 608 at 617 (1922). Cf. CoNFLICT oP LAws REsTATBMBNT §523 (1934).
Sanford v. Thompson, 18 Ga. 554 (1855) is an American decision with the same factual situation as in In re Lorillard except that the beneficiaries did not reside in Georgia but in
Alabama, place of the domiciliary administration. The Georgia court ordered transfer of the
assets to Alabama for administration there under the laws of Alabama.
138 DBPITRB, EssAI SUR LB SYSTBMB ANGLAIS DB CONFLITS DB LOIS EN MATIERE DB
SUCCESSION 42 (1936).
139 DxcBY, CoNFLICT OP LAws, 6th ed., 815 (1949); GooDRICH, CoNFLICT OP LAws,
3d ed., 576 (1949); CoNFLICT oP LAws REsTATBMBNT §522 (1934).
140 Expression used by Judge Goodrich in "Yielding Place to New: Rest Versus Motion
in the ConHict of Laws,'' 50 Cot. L. REv. 881 at 885 (1950).
141 The English courts have applied "comity" to a very large degree in the field of
bankruptcy. See DICEY, CONFLICT OP LAws, 6th ed., by Lipstein, 440 (1949); GRAVBSON,
CONFLICT oP LAws 358 (1948); ScHMITrHoPP, ENGLISH CONFLICT OP LAws, 3d ed., 259
(1948). ''The title of foreign assignees, in whom the property of the bankrupt is vested by
the law of the country, in which he is domiciled, would be recognized in the English
courts. The effect of a foreign bankruptcy upon an attachment in England must depend on
the stage of the proceedings, when the bankruptcy takes place, and the steps, which the
assignees take, to defeat the attachment." Opinion dated Temple, Dec. 25, 1837 of the
Attorney General CJ. Campbell, afterwards Lord Campbell) filed in Stansfield v. Horsfall's
Assignees decided by the Supreme Court Liibeck, sitting in Hamburg cases, July 21, 1841,
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United States
In a discussion of the conllicts law in the United States on allowance of claims in the case of insolvent decedents' estates, various sources
of law must be considered: case law and statutory provisions in the
states, the National Bankruptcy Act, and the Federal Constitution.
For case law, the statement of rules on insolvent decedents' estates in
the Restatement of the law of conflict of laws furnishes a goud starting
point for the discussion. These rules in the Restatement appear in the
part "Decedents' Estates" of the chapter "Administration of Estates."142
The chapter has no part on "Bankruptcy"143 but has one on "Receivership" where the same rules on proof and allowance of claims are stated
again.144 It might have been feasible and practical to state the rules
once in a part entitled"Insolvent Estates" for all types of such estates.
The main rules in the Restatement on proof and payment of claims
are
Section 497. "All creditors of a decedent who have proved
their claims in a competent court in which there are administration
proceedings of the estate of that decedent are entitled to share pro
rata in any application of the assets of the local administrator to
the payment of claims irrespective of the source of such assets or
of the residence, place of business, dornicil or citizenship of the
creditors, except (a) where there are valid claims against specific
funds, or (b) where there are valid preferences given by local
statute to creditors of a particular class."
Section 501. "In the payment of creditors of an insolvent
estate, the court in each state will, as far as possible, secure pro rata
payment of all claims."
The sections which immediately follow, 502 and 503, give methods
to accomplish the result suggested in section 501. Section 503 repeats
the principle stated in section 501, adding that the assets shall be "marshalled" to secure to all creditors a pro rata of their claims. An illustration which is added shows what is meant here by marshalling. 145 In
1(1) Sammlung von Erkenntnissen und Entscheidungen des Ober-Appellations-Gerichts zu
Lubeck in Hamburgischen Rechtssachen, N.F., 114 at 119 (Hamburg 1855).
142 CoNFLicr OF LAws REsTATEMENT, c. XI, §§501
143 Abroad, it may be noted, it is thought at some

to 503 (1934).
places that the Restatement has
rules on bankruptcy. The French edition of the Restatement has brought the rules on receivership as rules on bankruptcy by translating receivership with faillite (bankruptcy).
EXPosE nu DnoIT INrmtNATIONAL P.RIVll AMERICAIN §§525 et seq. (1937).
144 CoNFLicr OF LAws RESTATEMENT §§558 to 560 (1934).
145 CoNFLicr OF LAws REsTATEMENT §503, illustration (I) (1934). In re Estate of
Hirsch, 146 Ohio St. 393, 66 N.E. (2d) 636 (1946), reversing 76 Ohio App. 69, 63 N.E.
(2d) 174 (1945); In re Hameddy's Estate, 176 Wis. 570, 186 N.W. 744 (1922), noted 6
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the illustration, the estate, in process of administration in three states,
is taken as a whole to determine what percentage of the claims the total
assets will pay. Distribution is then made by each administration of its
assets to those who have proved in the state up to the percentage which
can be paid to all creditors out of the total assets. If a surplus remains,
it is turned over to an administration where the assets are insufficient to
distribute the total percentage.
Such a marshalling presupposes cooperation of the 5everal administrations. The percentage available for all claims out of the total of the
assets cannot be determined without exchange of information. Agreement must be reached on the percentage and it must be certain also
that the distributions will be made in the several administrations accordingly. The needed cooperation is not always obtainable. The Restatement acknowledges the fact that limitations exist with respect to the
applicability of the suggested method by stating that the assets shall be
marshalled "as far as possible."
In the illustration to section 503 no claim was proved in more than
one state. Section 502 covers situations where creditors have proved
several times and have received a dividend in one administration.
Section 502. "If the entire estate is insolvent, the court in each
state in paying claimants who have proved their claims therein will
pay only such proportion of each claim as, added to what the claimant has theretofore received in other states, will put him on an
equality with the other creditors paid in the local court."

The Comment explains under the heading "Marshalling Dividends" that, "if a certain dividend is declared in a court upon claims
proved therein, the amount received by each claimant in other states
will be deducted from any payment that he would receive in the distribution."146 "This results," the Comment proceeds, "in such marshalling of the assets that no claimant paid in that court can receive as
a result of its payment a larger proportion of his claim than other creditors have received from that court." It is the principle of equalization
or hodge podge rule.
·
·
The principle of equalization can be applied whether the several
administrations cooperate or not. The individual creditor who proves
MINN. L. REv. 410 (1922). GooDBICH, CoNFucr op LAws, 3d ed., 574 (1949); STUM:BEnc, CoNFLicr oP LAws 422 (1937).

146 CoNFucr OP LAWS REsTATEMENT §502, comment (a) (1934). Ramsay v. Ramsay, 196 ill. 179, 63 N.E. 618 (1902); Miner, Beal & Hackett v. Austin, 45 Iowa 221,
227 (1876); Tyler v. Thompson, 44 Tex. 497, 23 Am. Rep. 600 (1876). GooDRICH,
CoNFLicr OP LAws, 3d ed., 573 (1949); Note, 92 A.L.R. 596 (1934).
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his claim can be made to state what he has received elsewhere. For
the creditors proof in all administrations is often the only way in which
they can be sure of obtaining their full share in all the assets. The
possibility of a shortcut by proving only locally depends upon the importance of the local assets, the amount of claims proved locally, and
the local law on the question how the local assets shall be used. In some
states the local creditors receive their pro rata with preference.
The law is not uniform on the question whether the local assets
may be used to pay the pro rata available out of the total of the assets
with priority to local creditors. The Restatement has no rule to that
effect and in the majority of the states such priority is not granted.
Statutory provisions in some states prescribe the priority payment.
One of the early conflicts decisions involving local assets of an insolvent nonresident was the Massachusetts case, Dawes 11. Head,1 41
decided in 1825. The domiciliary administration was in Calcutta.
The court ordered preferential payment of the pro rata to the local creditors. In the words of Chief Justice Parker it was a way "to avoid, on
the one hand, the injustice of taking the whole funds for the use of our
citizens ... , and on the other, the equal injustice and greater inconvenience of compelling our own citizens to seek satisfaction of their
debts in distant countries."148
The ruling found its way into the statute books of Massachusetts.149
Since 1836 the statute provides:

(I) "If ... [a nonresident] dies insolvent, his estate found in
the commonwealth shall, as far as practicable, be so disposed of
that all his creditors here and elsewhere may receive equal proportions of their respective debts...."
(2) "The estate shall not be transmitted to the foreign executor or administrator until all the creditors who are citizens of this
commonwealth have received the proportion which would be due
to them if the whole estate of the deceased, wherever found, which
is applicable to the payment .of common creditors, were divided ...
in proportion to their respective debts ...."
147 3 Pick. 127 (20 Mass. 1825). In addition to Massachusetts creditors, creditors from
New York, New Hampshire, and England asked for allowance of their claims.
148 Id. at 147. Cf., however, at 143: "Thus this action is determined without touching
the questions upon which it was supposed it would tum, which are of a novel and delicate
nature, and though often glanced at, do not appear to have been decided either in this or
any other State of the Union. We wish to avoid anything which may be construed into a
conclusive adjudication, and yet are of opinion that it will be useful to throw out for consideration the results of our reasonings upon this subject."
149 Mass. Rev. Stat. (1836) c. 70, §§23 to 26.
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(3) "[A]nd no creditor not a citizen of this commonwealth
shall be paid out of the assets found here until all those who are
such citizens have received the proportion provided in the preceding section...."
( 4) "If there is a residue after such payment to the citizens of
this commonwealth, it may be paid to any other creditors who have
duly proved their debts here, in proportion to the amount due to
each of them, but no one shall receive more than would be due to
him if the whole estate were divided ratably among all the creditors as before provided. The remainder may be transmitted to the
foreign executor or administrator...."150
Maine,151 Rhode Island,1 52 Missouri,153 and North Dakota154 have
the same statutory provision as Massachusetts. In Michigan where no
such legislation is in force, the highest court ordered in a recent case
that the pro rata be paid with priority to the resident creditors.
In the case, In re Estate of Brauns,1 55 the domiciliary administration was pending in the state of Washington and an ancillary administration took place in Michigan. The estate as a whole was insolvent.
The Michigan court of first instance held that creditors from Washington and Wisconsin were entitled to present their claims for allowance
in the Michigan administration; it reserved the question of the right of
the nonresident claimants to participate pro rata or otherwise with any
other creditors whose claims were allowed in Michigan. A Michigan
creditor and the Michigan ancillary administrator appealed. The appellees argued that they had a right to participate pro rata in the Michigan assets and that "in any event the Michigan creditors should not
be paid a larger percentage of their claims than is paid to all other
creditors of the same class; and if necessary to accomplish this result,
any funds in excess of the amount necessary to make pro rata payment
to Michigan creditors . . . should be accounted for to the domiciliary
estate." The Supreme Court of Michigan upheld the decision, declaring that it would be unconstitutional, in view of Blake 11. McClung, not
to allow the nonresidents to present their claims for allowance in the
150 6 Mass. Ann. Laws (1933) c. 199 ("Settlement of Estates of Deceased NonResidents"), §§3 to 5. NEWHALL, SETI'LEMENT OP EsTATEs OP DECEASED PERSONS IN
MASSACHUSETTS, 3d ed., 148 (1937).
151 Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 143, §§33, 34.
152R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 575, §§40, 41.
158 1 Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) §§255 to 259.
154 N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §§30-2134 to 30-2136.
155 276 Mich. 598, 268 N.W. 890 (1936), noted, 21 MINN. L. REv. 331, 2 Mo. L.
REv. 103 (1937).
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ancillary administration proceedings in the state. It ruled that the local
creditors should be paid their pro rata "to the full extent that other
creditors will be paid out of the estate . . . before nonresident creditors
are permitted to participate in Michigan assets."
In Blake v. McClung,1 56 decided in 1898, the Supreme Court of
the United States declared a- Tennessee statute of 1877157 on foreign
corporations unconstitutional insofar as it preferred the claims of resident creditors to those of natural persons who are citizens of other states
of the Union. The statute involved, still on the statute book,1 68 provides: "... creditors ... who may be residents of this state shall have
a priority in the distribution of assets, or subjection of the same, or any
part thereof, to the payment of debts over all simple contract creditors,
being residents of any other country or countries ...."169 The opinion
expounded that "creditors who are citizens of other States are entitled,
under the Constitution of the United States, to stand upon the same
plane with creditors of like class who are citizens of such State, and cannot be denied equality of right simply because they do not reside in that
State, but are citizens residing in other States of the Union."160
One may wonder whether a priority as prescribed by the Massachusetts statute for citizens of the commonwealth with respect to the payment of the pro rata is in accordance with the clause of the Constitution
applied in Blake v. McClung which provides that "the citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in
the several States."161 The clause would no doubt be violated if, as a
consequence of the preferential payment of the pro rata, a citizen of
another state did not, finally, receive his equal share in the local assets.
Differential treatment may appear to some in violation of the Privileges
and Immunities clause even if the share in the local assets is received
through the medium of another administration.162 From the practical
156 172 U.S. 239, 19 S.Ct. 165 (1898), on further appeal, 176 U.S. 59, 20 S.Ct. 307
(1900).
157Tenn. Laws 1877, c. 31, §5.
158 3 Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1942) §4134.
159 In Morgan Bros. v. Dayton Coal & Iron Co., 134 Tenn. 228 at 282, 183 S.W.
1019 (1915), the Bank of Montreal, one of the creditors, invoked without success against the
discriminatory rule the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty between this country and Great Britain of
March 2, 1899, relating to the Tenure and Disposition of Real and Personal Property, 31
Stat. L. 1939.
160172 U.S. 239 at 258, 19 S.Ct. 165 (1898).
161 U.S. CoNsT., Art. IV, §2 (1). Cf. Notes, 87 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 328 (1939); 77
UNIV. PA. L. Rnv. 1001 (1929).
162 It is interesting that the drafters themselves had hesitated to recomme~d the differentiation. "There is no principle of comity that requires us to let in creditors from any
other country, when the citizens of this Commonwealth will thereby be deprived of their
just proportion. If it should be thought that this restriction ought to be confined to foreign-
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viewpoint, the local administration is often unable to find out exactly
to what dividend the local creditors are entitled out of the whole
estate. 103 In such cases the provision of the statute will be difficult to
apply.
The merits of a provision which prescribes preferential payment of
the pro rata to the resident creditors in all circumstances may be questioned regardless of the question of feasibility and of constitutionality.
The highest court of Massachusetts has declined to follow the rule in
a receivership case, Buswell v. Order of the Iron Hall.164 From the
viewpoint of protection, the strict rule is not necessary. The creditors
have the protection of the Federal Constitution against discrimination
when distributions take place within the United States. With regard
to assets abroad, the principle of equalization protects local creditors
against the possibility of other creditors using the local assets to obtain
more than their equal share in the whole estate-and that is all that
can be achieved locally from the viewpoint of protection. The inconvenience of multiple proof is obvious. Multiple proof is however the
logical and legal consequence of independent administrations and the
argument of inconvenience made in Dawes v. Head, where the other
administration was in Calcutta, cannot be used with the same force
generally, especially not in cases where the other administration takes
place within the United States. The inconvenience involved may not
be such as to justify differential treatment. A rule which leaves no
leeway to the courts is inadvisable particularly in the difficult conflicts
field.1s5
If a priority were to be established at all for the pro rata payment,
more equitable classifications than merely "residence" could be thought
of.1ss
ers, and that citizens of all the United States ought in this case stand on the same footing
with the citizens of this state, it will be necessary only to strike out the 'state,' in the two
places where the word occurs in this section, and to insert 'the United States.'" Note to
Section 25, II Report of the Commissioners appointed to revise the General Statutes of the
Commonwealth 74 (1834).
163 Stressed already by Parker, C.J., in Goodall v. Marshall, 11 N.H. 88, 100, 35 Am.
Dec. 472 (1840). Cf. Miner, Beal & Hackett v. Austin, 45 Iowa 221 at 227 (1876).
1s4 161 Mass. 224 at 234, 36 N.E. 1065 (1894). Cf. GooDBICH, CONFLICT oF LAws,
3d ed., 597 (1949).
165 Distinctions, e.g., between international and interstate conflicts situations have been
always made when appropriate in the matter of "comity." See, for interprovincial conflicts
in France before adoption of the Code Napoleon, DELAUME, LEs coNFLITS DE LOIS A LA
VEILLE DU CODE CIVIL 9 (1947).
166 Cf. the New York law on the liquidation of assets of foreign corporations which
have ceased to do business or have been dissolved, liquidated, or nationalized, N.Y. Civ.
Prac. Act, §977-b, subd. 16(c), which gives priority to claims which accrued or arose in
favor of persons residing and corporations organized in the United States or in a state there-
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Kentucky has a provision in its statute which differs in various
respects from what is prescribed by the Massachusetts type statute:

"If a non-resident decedent's estate found in this state is insufficient to pay the creditors here, it shall be disposed of without preference, pro rata, among the creditors here and such of those elsewhere as prove and demand their debts here within two years after
the appointment of a personal representative here. There shall be
deducted from foreign debts the amount received, or which can be
received, by the foreign creditors from assets of the estate not in
this state, and if the foreign assets and estate are sufficient to pay
all the foreign debts, then no part of them shall be allowed or paid
.
here. ~"
Under this rule, enacted in 1897,1 68 no priority is granted generally
to the resident creditors but they are given prefer~ntial treatment under
special circumstances. First, foreign debts will not share in the local
assets when the foreign assets are sufficient to pay all.foreign debts. In
such a case foreign creditors will not want to share in the insufficient
local assets. But how will it be proved, and by whom, that the foreign
assets are sufficient to pay all foreign debts? Secondly, it is said that
there shall be deducted from foreign debts the amount received, or
which can be received, by the foreign creditors from assets outside the
state. Shall no deduction be made from local debts of amounts received
from outside assets? The equality among the local creditors would not
be maintained. And for the foreign creditors, how will it be determined what they "can" receive from assets not in the state? Thirdly,
it seems that the local creditors are to be paid in full, notwithstanding
the insolvency of the estate as a whole, if the local assets are sufficient
to pay all of them. Citizens of another state of the Union would be
able to attack the refusal of their equal share under the ruling of Blake
v. McClung. 169
of, and for claims based on causes of action which accrued or arose in the state of New
York.
161 Ky.
168 Act
169 Cf.

Rev. Stat. (1948) §396.160.
of 1891, c. 156, §64.
Duehay v. Acacia Mut. L. Ins. Co., 70 App. D.C. 245, 105 F. (2d) 768
(1939) respecting D.C. Code (1929) §29-191 now (1940) §18-501: "On the death of any
person not domiciled in the District of Columbia at the time of his death so much of his
real and personal estate in the District of Columbia as may be necessary for the payment
and discharge of just claims against him of creditors and persons domiciled in the District
of Columbia shall also be the subject of administration. • • ." In order to uphold its constitutionality, the Court of Appeals gave the last part the reading: " ••• creditors, 'wherever domiciled, and other' persons domiciled in the District of Columbia shall also be the
subject of administration•••." [at 777].
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The federal law has sought to cover the situation within its jurisdiction by a provision in the National Bankruptcy Act. Section 65(d)
of the act deals with the problem of equalization arising when concurrent bankruptcies take place here and abroad.
"Whenever a person shall have been adjudged a bankrupt by
a court without the United States and also by a court of bankruptcy, creditors residing within the United States shall first be
paid a dividend equal to that received in the court without the
United States by other creditors before creditors who have received
a dividend in such courts shall be paid any amounts."170
The principle involved is the one stated in Lord Mansfield's dictum
in Rickards v. Hudson but it has been given limitations in the application. According to the text, only resident creditors shall be prepaid a
dividend equal to that received by other creditors out of a foreign
estate. Assuming two bankruptcies, one here and one in South America, if an American in Paris or a creditor in Canada has proved his claim
here, and only here, why should these creditors not also receive first
a dividend equal to the one paid in South America to other creditors
before these other creditors may participate in the distributions'? The
distinction made has no basis in law or equity.171
The text does not take into account that creditors residing within
the United States may be among those who received a dividend abroad.
In the absence of a text, the principle of equalization would no doubt
be applied in order to maintain equality. Does the language of the
text preclude application of the principle'? The drafters seems to have
thought only of situations where the creditors here do not prove abroad
but circumstances make such proof often necessary.
The Bankruptcy Acts of 1800, 1841, and 1867 had no provision
on equalization; neither had, nor have, the English acts. The idea to
include one may have come from the Lowell draft of a Bankruptcy Act,
introduced in Congress in 1882, which provided:
The estate of such bankrupt within the United States shall be
so divided, as far as practicable, that all creditors, here and elsewhere, shall receive proportional shares of the whole assets here
and elsewhere; and, especially, that creditors who are citizens of
the United States, and who have not proved their debts abroad,
110 30 Stat. L. 564 (1898), 11 U.S.C. (1938) §l05(d). Baiz v. Coro and La Vela
R.R. and Improvement Co., 87 N.J. Eq. 438 at 458, 101 A. 395 (1917).
171 The National Bankruptcy Conference has, at its meeting in New York on February
23, 1951, adopted a resolution in favor of the removal of the limitation.
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shall receive such proportionate share. When this object has been
attained, or secured, the judge may order the residue of the assets
to be transmitted to the assigne~ or other persons entitled thereto
under the foreign proceedings, or to be divided here as may seem
best.112
The aim of this draft was protection of all creditors against unequal
treatment as a result of distributions abroad. No differentiation between
resident and nonresident creditors was intended. Judge Lowell, whom
Professor Williston once called the "ablest and dearest judge in bankruptcy matters who ever sat upon the bench in this country,"173 had
closely followed the provisions in the Massachusetts law on insolvent
decedents' estates but dropped the rule which prescribes preferential
payment of the pro rata to Massachusetts creditors.
Section 65(d) of the National Bankruptcy Act has been left untouched in the many revisions of the act. A re-examination of the text
is needed. A provision which can serve as a model will :µelp in the
efforts on international level now made to obtain removal of all remaining discriminatory rules in bankruptcy legislation.174
The latest eff9rt to write a rule on marshalling of assets is one by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
The Uniform, Ancillary Administration of .Estates Act, adopted in
194'71 75 and promulgated in 1949176 after protracted discussions with
the American Bar Association/ 77 has the following provision on payment of claims in case of insolvency:
S~ction 1!• (Payment of Claims in Case of Insolvency.)

(1) Equality subject to preferences and security. If the estate
either in this state or as a whole is insolvent, it shall be disposed
of so that, as far as possible, each creditor whose claim has been
l72 Sec. 106(2), S. 1382, 47th Cong., 2d. sess. (1882). Low.ELL, SKBTCH Ol' AN Acrr
To EsTAllLISH A UNil'oRM SYSTEM Ol' BANKRUPTCY THROUGHOUT THE UmTED STATES,
3d rev. ed., 40 (1880). Cf. Nadelmann, "The National Bankruptcy Act and the Conflict
of Laws," 59 HARV. L. R:sv. 1025 at 1049 (1946).
173 Williston, Book Review, 13 HAB.v. L. R:sv. 310 (1899).
l74 See [1950] Committee Reports of the American Branch of the International Law
Association 25 (1950) (Committee on Corporations Engaged in International Business);
Detroit Resolution of the Inter-American Bar Association, 98 Umv. PA. L. R:sv. 41 (1949).
l75 [1947] HANDBOOK Ol' THE NATIONAL CoNFERENCE Ol' CoMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 190, 202; 87 TRusTs AND EsTATES 335 (1948). For earlier drafts, see
[1946] HANDBOOK 174, 181 (fourth draft), [1944] HANDBOOK 311 (third draft), [1943]
HANDBOOK 207, 219 (second draft), [1942] HANDBOOK 253, 265 (first draft), [1940]
HANDBOOK 373 (report by the drafter, Professor Atkinson).
176 [1949] HANDBOOK 157, [1949] ANNuAL SURVEY ol' AMERICAN LAw 828 (1950).
1 77 See [1949-1950] PROCEEDINGS, SECTION Ol' REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST
LAw, A.BA., 1, 2 (1950), 88 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 594 (1949).
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allowed, either in this state or elsewhere, shall receive an equal
proportion of his claim subject to preferences and priorities and to
any security which a creditor has as to particular assets. If a preference or priority is allowed in another jurisdiction but not in this
state, the creditors so benefited shall receive dividends from local
assets only upon the balance of his claim after deducting the
amount of such benefit. The validity and effect of any security
held in this state shall be determined by the law of this state but a
secured creditor who has not released or surrendered his security
shall be entitled only to a proportion computed upon the balance
due after the value of all security not exempt from the claims of
unsecured creditors is determined and credited upon the claim
secured by it.
(2) Procedure. In case of insolvency and if local assets permit, each claim allowed in this state shall be paid its proportion,
and any balance of assets shall be disposed of in accordance with
section 12 [transfer of residue to domiciliary representative]. If
local assets are not sufficient to pay all claims allowed in this state
the full amount to which they are entitled under this section, local
assets shall be marshalled so that each claim allowed in this state
shall be paid its proportion as far as possible, after taking into
account all dividends on claims allowed in this state from assets in
other jurisdictions.
Commissioners' Note: The last sentence refers to the situation where a claim is allowed in two or more jurisdictions.178
The Uniform Act does not follow the example of the Restatement
where the two principles, marshalling (sections 501 and 503) and .
equalization (section 502), are stated separately. The act deals only
with marshalling. The principle as stated in section l l will take care
of situations where the assets are in states which adopt the Uniform
Act. Under the act, the administrations will be obliged to cooperate to
reach the result prescribed at the beginning of section l l.
With respect to assets elsewhere, if the foreign administration does
not cooperate, the common law principle of equalization will have to be
relied upon. If stated independently as in the Restatement, the equalization rule would have taken care of the situation dealt wtih especially
in the first paragraph of section l l where a creditor has been paid elsewhere with a priority not recognized under the local law. Priorities are
of course governed in each administration by its own law.179 Section l l
178 [1949] HANDBOOK 330 at 337.
179 CoNFLICT OF LAws R:ssTATEMENl'

§497 (1934); GoonmcH, CoNFLICT OF LAws,
3d ed., 572 (1949). An earlier draft of the Uniform Act had provided that priorities should
be governed by the domiciliazy law: [1946] HANDBOOK 179.
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prescribes equalization by deducting "the amount" of the benefit obtained in the other jurisdiction. It would seem that not the "amount''
but the percentage of the claim so obtained has to be taken into account.
This has been done in the receivership case, Carpenter v. Ludlum,1 80
where the court deducted from the claim of a Tennessee creditor the
percentage the creditor had received with priority in the Tennessee
receivership as a local creditor under the Tennessee statute known from

Blake v. 1"'\ll.cClung.

III
Almost fifty years ago the American Bar Association181 authorized
and directed its Committee on Commercial Law to advocate and urge
proper legislation by Congress on the lines recommended in a report
which stated inter alia that the bankruptcy law came short of accomplishing the full measure of equality and equity between the citizens of
the different states intended by the Constitution-makers in that it did
not provide for the administration in the bankruptcy court of the.insolvent estate of a deceased person.182 "Some one has wittily, but truly
said," the report related, "that all an insolvent debtor had to do to beat
the Bankrupt Law was to die before an adjudication in bankruptcy
could be made against him."183 "It is difficult to see," the report continued,"... why an attachment, for instance, against a sick man who
dies should be better than one against a well man who lives, or why a
preferential deed given by a man on his death bed should stand when
the same deed, if he lived, would be set aside."184 Amendments to the
Bankruptcy Act were passed in the year that followed but on other matters. In reporting to the association on the amendments passed, the
committee said: "We_ do not think it wise affirmatively to agitate for
further amendments at present. The amendments already adopted go
far toward perfecting the law, and the further amendments recommended will come naturally in good time as the country sees the necessity for them."185
What the committee had foremost in mind at the tum of the century with respect to decedents' estates were the inadequacies of the law
180 Carpenter v. Ludlum, (3d Cir. 1934) 69 F. (2d) 191, cert. den. 292 U.S. 655, 54
S.Ct. 869.
181 25 A.B.A. REP. 13 (1902).
182Id. at 408, 413 (Walter S. Logan, New York, was chairman of the Committee).
183 Id. at 413.
184 Id. at 415.
185 26 A.B.A. REP. 429 at 431. Attempts had been made in Congress to obtain repeal
of the whole Bankruptcy Act.
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in the states as compared with the new bankruptcy law. What came
increasingly to the fore with the years were the difficulties resulting
from multiple administrations. In one field of administration of estates,
receiverships, the situation became so serious during the depression
years that Congress had to act. Corporate reorganizations were made
possible on a national basis.186 The step seemed revolutionary at first
but the change was quickly accepted. Insolvent decedents' estates were
touched, too, but only in connection with compositions and extensions.
A further, lasting, step remains to be taken for insolvent estates of
deceased persons in the interest of good administration of justice.
Creditors should not be subjected to expense, delay, and complications
which are avoidable.
The committee on a "Uniform Ancillary Administration of Estates
Act" of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws stated in one of its reports: "Experience has brought home to
every practitioner these problems [of multiple administrations] which
are not only difficult of solution but frequently work out as destructive
of fair play and justice. Therefore, little space or time need be occupied
in establishing the desirability of a Uniform Act, even though such an
Act relieved against only a portion of the conflicts and confusion that
now attend ancillary administrations."187 The Uniform Act will not
improve to a substantial degree conditions in the case of insolvent estates. Multiple proof and all the problems of marshalling, for example,
remain. Neither will the Uniform Powers of Foreign Representatives
Act:1 88 substantially reduce the number of multiple administrations for
insolvent estates. In the case of such estates requests for. the opening
of local administrations are always likely. Even if multiple administrations became rarer as a result of these two acts, the status of the law on
insolvent estates in various states would continue to raise grave questions. Country-wide revision of the insolvent decedents' estates' law
will take a long time. An extension of the national bankruptcy legislation to estates of deceased persons can solve all problems at the same
time.
In discussing probate legislation, the desirability of uniformity, and
the need for a single administration, one of the foremost experts in the
field said recently: "What we should aim at as an ultimate goal is a
186 On the history of former section 77B and present chapter X of the National Bankruptcy Act, see FlNLllITER, THE LAw OF BANKRUPTCY REoRGANIZATION 19 (1939).
187 [1934] lf=BOOK 365.
188 [1944] lf=BOOK 325; Model Probate Code, §§256 to 260, in BASYE AND SrMEs,
PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW (1946). The act provides means for dispensing with ancillary
administration if no application is made therefor.
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single administration proceeding for the estate of each decedent, which
will be effective in all states .... There is no more reason, on principle,
why there should be an administration of a decedent's estate in every
state in which he has property than that there should be an administration of an estate in a bankruptcy in every state where the bankrupt
has property."189 Alone because of the problems. of marshalling, the
bankruptcy devotees may argue that the need for a single administration is greater for all insolvent estates.190 In view of the fact that Congress has power to pass uniform laws on bankruptcy, at least the problems of insolvent decedents' estates can be solved by the use of the
bankruptcy power. The application of the bankruptcy legislation to
decedents' estates will relieve the field of administration of decedents'
estates of problems which for it are a burdensome appendage. The
problems will become part of the field to which they belong.
An extension of the bankruptcy. legislation to estates of deceased
persons requires adjustments in the law to meet the problems of a varied
and special situation. In particular the conditions for an adjudication
may have to be broadened. The procedure will have to take into account all aspects of probate law. The solution of the questions involved
calls for a joint effort of the experts of bankruptcy and probate law.
189 Simes,

"Some Lessons from a Comparative Study of American Probate Legislation,"

[1948-1949] PROCEEDINGS, Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, A.B.A., 42
at 48 (1949).
190 Cf. 3 STORY, CoMMBNTARIBS ON THE CoNsnTIITION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1st
ed., §§1107, 1109 (1833).

